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Abstract: This paper examines the issues of institutional quality and central bank transparency 
through the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. We have found that the effects of 
transparency and corruption on macroeconomic performance and volatility depend on the relative 
importance of the marginal supply-side effects of distortionary tax and corruption, the degree of 
central bank conservativeness and/or the initial degree of opacity about central bank preferences. 
If the marginal effect of tax is relatively important, more opacity might induce higher level and 
volatility of inflation when the central bank is sufficiently conservative. Furthermore, opacity and 
tolerated corruption can mutually reinforce or weaken each other’s effects on the level and 
volatility of inflation. Transparency is generally a better strategy when the central bank is 
conservative. However, there could be a case for opacity in order to compensate for the 
undesirable macroeconomic effects of corruption when the central bank is liberal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lack of good governance and high levels of corruption are clearly prevalent in emerging 
market economies as shown by indices developed by Transparency International (TI, 2006) or the 
World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2007). They have significant effects on the economic development 
as well as international capital flows, tax evasion and stock market variability.1  
In terms of macroeconomic policy design, these issues are very important when monetary 
policy decisions are not taken independently of fiscal policy and inflation tax represents an 
important financial resource for public expenditures (Cukierman et al., 1992). In countries where 
central banks are not completely independent, corruption and rent seeking are correlated with 
higher rates of inflation and excessive public expenditures (Kaufman et al., 2007; Hefeker, 2010).  
Several recent researches have highlighted the role of weak public institutions, including high 
levels of corruption, in determining monetary and fiscal policy design as well as the choice of 
exchange rate regime in developing countries. Huang and Wei (2006) have shown that weak 
institutions, modelled as exogenous erosion in the ability of government to collect revenue 
through formal tax channels, have important implications for the design of monetary 
policymaking institutions. In particular, they have found that a pegged exchange rate is inferior to 
a Rogoff-style conservative central banker, whose optimal degree of conservativeness is 
proportional to the quality of institutions. Dimakou (2006) analyses the dynamic interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policies under different levels of bureaucratic corruption. She has 
found that the government has incentive to strategically increase debt and indirectly ‘force’ the 
independent central bank to pursue an expansionary monetary policy. Hefeker (2010) considers 
                                                 
1 The literature includes studies on the effects of institutions on development (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005) as well as investigations on the consequences of corruption for 
international capital flows, tax evasion, and stock market volatility (Wei, 2000, 2001; Bai and Wei, 2000; Fisman 
and Wei, 2004; Du and Wei, 2004). 
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that the government endogenously chooses the optimal level of institutional quality (corruption) 
and has found that credibly pegging exchange rate to an anchor currency, like a currency board, 
can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. Popkova (2008), by modelling the effects of 
corruption on production, has shown that if corruption has a considerable positive (negative) 
impact on output, a tight peg will increase (decrease) the level of corruption.  
Table 1. Corruption and CBT in countries with highly but incompletely independent central banks  
Countries CBI Index 
(maximum value=1) 
CBT Index 
(maximum value = 15) 
Corruption Index (world ranking) 
(maximum value = 10) 
Argentina 0.74 5.5 2.9 (106) 
Armenia 0.85 4 2.7 (120) 
Belarus 0.73 5 2.4 (139) 
Chile 0.77 7.5 6.7 (25) 
Czech Republic 0.73 11.5 4.9 (52) 
Estonia 0.78 6 6.6 (27) 
Hungary 0.67 9.5 5.1 (46) 
Israel 0.70 8.5 6.1 (32) 
Lithuania 0.78 4.5 4.9 (52) 
Peru 0.74 8 3.7 (75) 
Poland 0.89 8 5.0 (49) 
Slovak Republic 0.62 6 4.5 (56) 
Sources: The Cukierman Index of Central Bank Independence (CBI), 1989-2000. Worldwide Corruption 
Perceptions ranking of countries published by Transparency International (2009). For the Central Bank 
Transparency (CBT) Index, see Dincer and Eichengreen (2007).2  
However, the previous studies neglect one important characteristic of monetary policy 
decision in emerging market economies. Even though central banks in emerging market countries 
could be highly independent, they are characterized by different levels of transparency in 
communication with the public (see Table 1). Empirical evidence shows that central banks in 
these economies are less transparent than their counterparts in the advanced countries (Dincer and 
Eichengreen, 2007). One possible explanation is that they have incentive to be opaque about their 
monetisation operations given that the monetary financing of public deficit is important. 
                                                 
2 The CBI Index, the CBT Index and the Corruption Index are of the years 2000, 2005 and 2009 respectively. While 
we have not more actual data for the first two indexes, we observe in the surveys that they are generally increasing 
over time and the third index is quite stable.  
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Nevertheless, they have made much progress in this respect since the International Monetary 
Fund adopted a code of good conduct to increase the transparency of official operations in 
emerging markets, in part prompted by the 1994 peso and other emerging market crises (Wilson 
and Saunders, 2004; de Mendonça and Filho, 2008).  
Since the pioneer work of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), a large literature on central bank 
transparency has been developed, mostly for the case of developed countries and limited to the 
interaction between monetary authorities and private agents.3 Most economists are instinctually 
of the view that more information is better than less and hence agree that openness and 
communication with the public are crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in allowing 
the private sector to improve expectations and therefore to make Pareto improving decisions 
(Blinder, 1998; Eijffinger et al., 2000; Blinder et al., 2001; Hoeberichts et al., 2009). Adding 
distortions, some authors have provided counter-examples where information disclosure instead 
reduces the possibility for central banks to strategically use their private information, implying 
that greater transparency may not lead to a welfare improvement (Sorensen, 1991; Faust and 
Svensson, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Sibert, 2002). In effect, according to the theory of the second best, 
removing one distortion may not lead to a more efficient allocation when other ones are present.4  
The empirical literature has so far yielded mixed results on whether transparency significantly 
affects the average level of inflation and output gap, while it remains difficult to establish its 
effects on inflation and output volatility. According to Chortareas et al. (2002), disclosure of 
inflation forecasts reduces inflation but is not necessarily associated with higher output volatility. 
Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2007) have found that greater transparency benefits to inflation 
volatility, but has a less clear effect on output volatility and no effects on the average level of 
                                                 
3 See, for a survey, Geraats (2002) and Eijffinger and van der Cruijsen (2010) . 
4  See Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) for a short discussion of these counter-examples. 
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inflation and output. The analysis of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) suggests broadly favourable 
but relatively weak impacts on inflation and output volatility. 
A few studies examine the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in models which 
do not include the issue of imperfect institutional quality (Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2003; 
Ciccarone et al., 2007; Hefeker and Zimmer, 2009). By introducing supply-side fiscal policies, 
these studies have introduced the so-called fiscal bias. In the presence of fiscal bias, the 
uncertainty about central bank preferences, i.e. lack of political transparency in the sense of 
Geraats (2002), has important implications for macroeconomic stabilisation.  
This paper provides the first theoretical study about how institutional quality (corruption) 
could interact with fiscal policy and central bank transparency. For this purpose, we 
simultaneously consider two types of endogenous distortions, i.e. distortionary tax and 
corruption. The issue is important because emerging market economies suffer from corruption 
while at the same time their central banks have low levels of transparency. In this respect, our 
study could give an explanation of the reasons why transparency is relatively low in emerging 
market economies as well as some lessons about how transparency may improve institutional 
quality. The implications of our study could also be relevant for developed countries where 
corruption is significant and central banks are not fully transparent.5 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the model. 
The section after solves for the equilibrium. The fourth section studies how less transparency and 
more tolerance for corruption affects the level of inflation, output gap, distortionary tax rate and 
institutional quality. The fifth section examines the effects of opacity and tolerated corruption on 
macroeconomic volatility. We conclude in the last section. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, Greece, Italy and Portugal before they joined the Euro Zone.  
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2. The model 
 
Our analytical framework is based on models used by Alesina and Tabellini (1987), De Kock and 
Grilli (1993), Velasco (1996) and Huang and Wei (2006) among others. We introduce 
endogenous institutional quality (or corruption) as in Hefeker (2010). Output gap, x , in log 
terms, is a positive function of surprise inflation eππ −  (where π  is the inflation rate and eπ  the 
expected inflation rate), a negative function of distortionary tax rate on the total revenue of firms, 
τ , and a positive (or negative) function of corruption (Popkova, 2008), θ :6 
ψθγτππα +−−= )( ex ,  ,α 0>γ .     (1) 
Equation (1) stipulates that taxes are systematically non-neutral in their effects on output gap 
and hence distortionary in the sense of depressing output gap and thus employment more than 
surprise inflation can improve them. The presence of τ  could also represent non-wage costs 
associated with social security or job protection legislation, or the more general effects of supply-
side deregulation (Hughes-Hallett and Viegi, 2003). To focus on the effect of uncertainty about 
the central bank preferences, we do not introduce supply shocks in (1). 
The negative effect of corruption is due to its adverse effect on the investment of firms 
(Mauro, 1995; Campos et al., 1999), the efficiency of public expenditures (Del Monte and 
Papagni, 2001), the governance (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2007) and the factor 
requirements of firms (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007). However, the negative effect of corruption on 
the output gap could be counterbalanced by the positive effect. Under the “efficient corruption” 
hypothesis, corruption is considered as a way to compensate the distortion caused by the burden 
of distortionary taxation (Leff, 1964). Leff views corruption as “grease money” to lubricate the 
                                                 
6 The parameter γ  could be identical to α  as in Hefeker (2010), but it can also be different from α  as in Huang and 
Wei (2006), Popkova (2008) if there is possibility of fiscal leakage.  
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squeaky wheels of a rigid administration. Baretto (2000) has pointed out that the efficiency-
enhancing effect of corruption results from the fact that corruption can reduce bureaucratic 
inefficiency. Coppier and Michetti (2006) have shown that more corruption could be associated 
with more production, in accordance with some empirical evidence (Coppier and Piga, 2004). 
However, the “efficient corruption” hypothesis is not incontestable (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; 
Aidt, 2003; Méon and Sekkat, 2005).7 
Therefore, on a priori grounds, it is not always possible to make a precise guess on how 
corruption affects production. If the marginal effect of corruption is negative, we have 0>−ψγ . 
On the contrary, i.e. when 0>ψ , we may have either 0>−ψγ  or 0<−ψγ . The latter 
inequality implies that the marginal effect of corruption is higher than that of distortionary tax.  
To finance public expenditures ( g , as a percentage of national revenue), the government has 
two sources of revenue: an output tax at the rate τ , which is reduced by corruption θ , and an 
inflation tax π .8 The government’s budget constraint is:9 
θπτ −+=g .         (2) 
The government aims to simultaneously stabilize inflation and output gap as well as public 
expenditures around their respective targets, i.e. 0, x  and g . The introduction of a spending 
target could reflect the desire of being re-elected or other demands from interest groups that the 
government must satisfy. Moreover, as Hefeker (2010), we assume that the government is 
concerned with corruption (or leakages of fiscal revenue) and tries to control its level around the 
                                                 
7 Méon and Weill (2008) have found that the grease the wheels hypothesis could be observed in countries where 
institutions are ineffective. 
8 There is ample evidence suggesting that seigniorage (defined as an increase in base money) is an important source 
of government revenue for developed countries and could account for more than ten percentage points of national 
revenue for developing countries (Cukierman et al., 1992). While the central bank is independent, it continues to pay 
the seigniorage revenue to the government as it is observed empirically.  
9 We can introduce a coefficient before π  in (2). For simplicity, we assume that it is equal to one.  
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tolerated level (θ ). In effect, increasing corruption might result in protest from the population, 
lower foreign investment or less support from international financial organizations. Corruption 
fighting, through more control of public servants, reduction of the influence of interest groups 
and rent-seeking, and creation of better institutions like setting up independent courts and 
improving public administration, implies a cost for the government. On the other hand, a 
reduction in corruption leads to alienation of former beneficiaries of corruption, such as interest 
groups or bureaucrats that resist corruption fighting. Due to the personal or political costs of 
fighting corruption, deviations of the level of corruption in either direction from θ  are costly.  
The government’s objective function is: 
])()()([
2
1 2
3
2
2
22
1 θθδδπδ −+−+−+= ggxxLG .    (3) 
Following Rogoff (1985), we assume that the government, while keeping control of its fiscal 
instrument, delegates the conduct of monetary policy to an independent central bank. Therefore, 
the central bank is unlikely to be made responsible for public expenditure deviations and is only 
concerned with the inflation rate and output gap. We assume that the central bank sets its policy 
in order to minimize the following loss function: 
]))(1()[(
2
1 22 xxLCB −++−= επεμ , 0>μ ,    (4)     
where parameter μ  is the relative weight that the central bank assigns to the inflation target and 
it might be different from that of the government. It is therefore an index of conservatism (larger 
values of μ ) versus liberalism or populism (smaller values of μ ). The central bank’s policy 
instrument is π .10 Inserting a positive output-gap target (i.e. 0>x ) in the objective functions, 
destined to correct a shortfall in output due to the distortionary effects of taxes, introduces an 
                                                 
10 In practice, the central bank would use interest rates. Since the standard theoretical models assume that nominal 
interest rates have no systematic long-run influence on output, we may as well use π . 
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inflationary bias. Since it does not significantly modify our principal analytical results concerning 
the effects of transparency, in the following, we assume that 0=x .  
The transparency issue is introduced by assuming that the weights assigned by the central 
bank to inflation and output gap targets are not perfectly predictable by the government and 
private sector.11 Following Ciccarone et al. (2007), the imperfect disclosure of information about 
central bank preferences is represented by the fact that ε  is a stochastic variable.12 This 
specification of central bank’s loss function is adopted in order to avoid the arbitrary effects of 
central bank preference uncertainty on monetary policy underlined by Beetsma and Jensen 
(2003). In effect, a slight change in the uncertainty specification (e.g., putting the stochastic 
parameter in front of one or the other argument of the central bank’s objective function) can lead 
to radically different effects on monetary reactions. 
We assume that the density function of ε  is characterised by 0)( =εE , 22 )()var( εσεε == E  
and ],1[ με −∈ . The variance 2εσ  represents the degree of opacity about central bank preferences. 
As the random variable ε  takes values in a compact set and has an expected value equal to zero, 
2εσ  must have a well defined upper bound, i.e. ],0[2 μσε ∈ .13 When 02 =εσ , the central bank is 
perfectly predictable and hence fully transparent.  
 
3. The equilibrium 
                                                 
11 Transparency about the central bank’s preferences, following the terminology defined by Geraats (2002), can be 
considered as political transparency which refers to openness about policy objectives and institutional arrangements. 
It corresponds to one of the five motives for central bank transparency, i.e. political transparency, economic 
transparency, procedural transparency, policy transparency and operational transparency.  
12 This formulation is similar to what is proposed by Geraats (2002) for avoiding the arbitrary effects of opacity. She 
assigns a weight ξαα −=  to the output target and ξββ +=  to the inflation target in the central bank’s loss 
function, with 1=+ βα , and α  and β  as their expected values. See also Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2003).  
13 See Ciccarone et al. (2007) for a proof. 
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The timing of the game is as follows: Firstly, the private sector forms rational expectations about 
inflation and sets wages, then the government chooses the tax rate and corruption and the central 
bank makes the monetary policy decision to attain the inflation target. The fiscal and monetary 
authorities play a non-cooperative Nash-game.14 The model is solved by using backward 
induction. 
Taking account of equations (1) and (2), the minimisation of the loss function (3) leads to the 
following reaction functions for the government: 
ge 222
2
2 )()()( δγαπθδγψτδγπγαδ +−=+−++− ,    (5)  
θδδαψπθδδψτδγψπδαψ 3232222 )()()( +−=++++−− ge .    (6) 
The reaction function of the central bank, which minimises the loss function (4) taking 
account of the economic constraint represented by equation (1), is given as:  
eπεαψθεαγτεαπεαεμ )1()1()1()]1()[( 22 +=+++−++− .   (7) 
Taking the expected inflation rate as given, we solve equations (5)-(7) to obtain the solutions 
of π , τ  and θ  in terms of expected inflation rate and exogenous variables as follows:  
}])[()1({1 32
eg απγθψγδδεαπ
ε
++−+Δ= ,    (8) 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
++++−+
++−+−−−
++−+−−−
Δ= θδδψαεαδγψεμ
απδδεαγδεμψγδεμ
δαδεαδεμεμψγψ
τ
ε
322
3232
233
]))(1())([(
])1()()()[(
])1()())(([
1 e
g
 ,  (9) 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−++++
−−−−−−
Δ= θδδγεμδεαγα
απδψγεμδψγεμγθ
ε 3222
22
)])(()1()[(
))(())((1 eg  ,   (10) 
                                                 
14 We can also consider a Stackelberg game as the solution concept, with the government being the Stackelberg 
leader and the central bank the follower. 
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where 323
2
22
2 )1)((])())[(( δδεγααδγδδψγεμε +++++−−=Δ . Using equations (8)-(10) to 
eliminate π , eπ  and τ  in equation (1), the output gap can be expressed in terms of expected 
inflation rate and exogenous variables as follows: 
)(
)()())(( 323232
ε
πδδεμαδδεμγθδδεμψγ
Δ
−−−−−−−=
egx .  (11) 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, equation (8) implies that: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
Δ
++−+=
)(
])[()1( 32
ε
απγθψγδαδεπ
e
e gE .    (12) 
Taking account of opacity, we solve equation (12) for the expected inflation rate:  
32
2
32
1
])[(
δδα
γθψγδαδπ Ω−
+−Ω= ge ,      (13) 
where Ω  is defined as 0
323
2
22
2 )1)((])())[((
1 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=Ω +++++−− + δδεγααδγδδψγεμ εE . Applying the second-
order Taylor approximation to Ω  leads to:  
,])(2][)())[(1(  1 23
0
3203
2
22
2
0
εσδδγααδγδδψγμ Δ
+−Δ++−++Δ≈Ω  (14) 
with 323
2
22
2
0 )(])()[( δδγααδγδδψγμ ++++−=Δ .  
The equilibrium solutions of π , τ  and θ  can be obtained by substituting the solution of eπ  
into equations (8)-(11). 
 
4. The effects of opacity and tolerated corruption on the equilibrium 
 
Before analyzing the effects of opacity on the expected and current inflation rate, output gap, tax 
rate and corruption, we briefly discuss the case of full transparency (i.e. 02 =εσ  and 0=ε ). 
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Introducing 02 =εσ  and 0=ε  into equations (13) and (14) and taking account of the 
approximation of Ω , we obtain: 
32
2
0
32 ])[(
δδα
γθψγδαδπ −Δ
+−= ge .       (15) 
Using the solution of eπ  given by equation (15) as well as equations (8)-(11), we can 
straightforwardly get the solutions of π , τ , θ  and x .  
In examining equations (8)-(11) and (15), we remark that, by assumption (i.e., 0=x ), the 
well-known inflation bias problem in the standard Barro-Gordon model is absent here. However, 
the government introduces a fiscal bias through a wage expectation effect. In effect, as it attempts 
to increase output through higher public expenditures, which are financed by higher distortionary 
tax or inflation tax according to equation (2). As the central bank is assumed to be independent, 
the government cannot directly request the central bank to create an inflation tax. However, 
higher taxes on the revenue will generate output distortions which incite the central bank to raise 
the inflation rate to counterbalance the distortionary effects of taxation and hence to create some 
seigniorage revenue for the government. Consequently, workers claim higher nominal wages. On 
the other hand, the government fights corruption but admits that a certain level of corruption θ  is 
inevitable. This implies a loss of fiscal revenue for the government, which must be financed by a 
higher distortionary tax or inflation tax. If 0>−ψγ , then the induced increase of tax rate 
intended to compensate the loss of fiscal revenue due to corruption has a larger effect on 
production than that of corruption, leading the central bank to favour an increase in inflation to 
moderate the decrease of output gap. That explains why the expected inflation rate is positively 
related to θ  when 0>−ψγ .  
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Deriving equations (13) and (8)-(11) with respect to θ  and taking account of the 
approximation of Ω  given by (14) as well as the definition of 0Δ  yield: 
2
3203
2
22
2
32
22
032
2
0
3
032
])(2][)())[(1() (
)(
εσδδγααδγδδψγμδδαδδα
ψγδαδ
θ
π
+−Δ++−+−Δ−Δ
Δ−Ω=∂
∂ e . (16) 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂+−+Δ=∂
∂ ])[()1(1 32 θ
παψγδδεαθ
π
ε
e
,         (17) 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
∂++−+−−−
++++−
Δ=∂
∂
θ
πδδεαγδεμψγδεμα
δδψαεαδγψεμ
θ
τ
ε
e
])1()()()[(
]))(1())([(
1
3232
322
 ,       (18) 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−++++∂
∂−−−Δ=∂
∂
32
2
22 )])(()1()[())((
1 δδγεμδεαγαθ
παδψγεμθ
θ
ε
e
,    (19) 
0)( 32 <∂
∂
Δ
−−=∂
∂
θ
πδδεμα
θ ε
ex ,             (20) 
where 0])()[( 323
2
22
2
32
2
0 >+++−=−Δ δαγδδγδδψγμδδα . Analysing the above partial 
derivatives under full transparency leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the case of full transparency, an increase in the tolerated level of corruption 
always induces an increase in the expected and current inflation rate but reduces the output gap 
if 0>−ψγ  and vice versa. It positively affects the tax rate and corruption whatever is the 
relative importance of γ  and ψ . 
Proof: Assuming 0=ε  and 02 =εσ , equations (16)-(20) become: 
0)(
32
2
0
32 >−Δ
−=∂
∂
δδα
ψγδαδ
θ
π e ,  if 0>−ψγ ,     (21) 
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0])[(1 32
0
>
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂+−Δ=∂
∂
θ
παψγδαδθ
π e ,       (22) 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂++−−+++Δ=∂
∂
θ
πδαδμγδψγμδαδδψααδγψμθ
τ e])([])()([1 3232322
0
, (23) 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++++∂
∂−−Δ=∂
∂
32
2
22
0
)]()[()(1 δδγμαδγαθ
παδψγμθ
θ e ,   (24) 
0
0
32 <∂
∂
Δ−=∂
∂
θ
πδαμδ
θ
ex .        (25) 
Substituting θ
π
∂
∂ e  given by equation (21) and using the definition of 0Δ  into equations (23) 
and (24), θ
τ
∂
∂  and θ
θ
∂
∂  can be developed as: 
0
)(
)()]()([
][)]()([
32
2
00
22
2
32
22
222
2
3
2
22
2
32
2
2232
>−ΔΔ
+++++++
+++−++
=∂
∂
δδα
αδμγγδψδδαγδψαδδγψμμδ
ψγγδαδμδαδψγαψδδγψμμδδ
θ
τ ,         (26) 
0
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32
>−ΔΔ
++++++
++−
=∂
∂
δδα
δγμαδγααγδγδμδ
δγμγαδψγμδδ
θ
θ .     (27) 
             Q.E.D. 
If the marginal effect of tax on production is greater than that of corruption (i.e. 0>−ψγ ), 
the effects of an increase in the level of corruption tolerated by the government on inflation 
expectations are positive. The more the government tolerates corruption, the more is the loss of 
tax revenue. Consequently, the government tends to increase the tax rate in order to balance its 
budget constraint. An increase in the tax rate and corruption will jointly have a negative effect on 
production, inciting the central bank to increase inflation in order to fulfil its objectives. 
Moreover, an increase in the inflation tax helps the government to balance its budget. We remark 
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that, according to equation (16), an increase in μ  (i.e. the degree of central bank 
conservativeness) diminishes the effects of an increase in θ  on the expected inflation rate. 
On the contrary, when the marginal effect of corruption is greater than that of tax (i.e. 
0<−ψγ ), the results will be reversed for the expected inflation, current inflation and output 
gap. In effect, when the positive marginal effect of corruption is important, it will strongly 
stimulate the production and hence will incite the central bank to reduce the inflation rate.  
The result, according to which the effects of an increase in θ  on the tax rate and corruption 
are not affected by the relative importance of γ  and ψ , is explained by the fact that the initial 
effects of an increase in θ  are not compensated by the secondary effects due to wage (inflation) 
expectations effect and central bank’s reaction to the fiscal bias.  
In the following, assuming that the central bank is opaque about its preferences, we will show 
that the effects of an increase in the tolerated level of corruption on endogenous variables depend 
on the degree of central bank conservativeness and the degree of opacity, in addition to the 
relative importance of marginal effects of tax and corruption on production. 
 
Proposition 2a: In the case of opacity, when 0>−ψγ , an increase in the tolerated level of 
corruption always induces an increase in the expected inflation rate if either of the following 
conditions is verified: 1) 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+>  and  22 εε σσ < ; 2) 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+< . 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
In Proposition 2a, 2εσ  represents a critical value for opacity which is defined as 
32
2
3203
2
22
2
2
0323
2
22
2
])(2][)())[(1(
}])()[({2
δδαδδγααδγδδψγμ
δαγδδγδδψγμ
εσ +−Δ++−+
Δ+++−= . While an increase in the tolerated level of 
corruption has a positive effect on the expected inflation rate under the conditions specified in 
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Proposition 2a, we remark that the opposite effect is also possible. In particular, a higher θ  will 
imply a lower expected inflation rate when the degree of opacity and the degree of central bank 
conservativeness are high enough, i.e. 22 εε σσ >  and 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> .  
 
Proposition 2b: In the case of opacity, under the assumption that 0>−ψγ , an increase in the 
tolerated level of corruption induces an increase in the inflation rate and a decrease in the output 
gap if 0>∂∂ θπ
e .  
Proof: Under the conditions where 0>∂∂ θπ
e
, we obtain from equations (17) and (20): 
0])[()1( 32 >∂
∂+−Δ
+=∂
∂
θ
παψγδδεαθ
π
ε
e
;  0)( 32 <∂
∂
Δ
−−=∂
∂
θ
πδδεμα
θ ε
ex .    Q.E.D.  
As we have already discussed, if the degree of opacity and the degree of central bank 
conservativeness are high enough, we could have 0<∂∂ θπ
e
. In this case, the results concerning the 
output gap would be reversed. As for the effects on the inflation rate, they are ambiguous. 
To determine the effects of an increase in the tolerated level of corruption under opacity, we 
substitute the solution of θ
π
∂
∂ e  given by equation (16) into equations (18)-(19) respectively, taking 
account of the approximation of Ω : 
,
])(2][)())[(1() (
)(}])(2][)())[(1(  {
])1()()()[(
]))(1())([(
1
2
3203
2
22
2
32
22
032
2
0
2
3203
2
22
22
0
323232
2
322
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+−Δ++−+−Δ−Δ
−+−Δ++−++Δ×
++−+−−
−
++++−
Δ=∂
∂
ε
εε
σδδγααδγδδψγμδδαδδα
ψγσδδγααδγδδψγμ
δδεαγδεμψγδεμδδα
δδψαεαδγψεμ
θ
τ
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2
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2
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2
22
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2
2
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2
2
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+−Δ++−+−Δ−Δ
−+−Δ++−++Δ−−−
+−+++
Δ=∂
∂
ε
εε σδδγααδγδδψγμδδαδδα
ψγσδδγααδγδδψγμδδαδψγεμ
δδγεμδεαγα
θ
θ
            
We notice that, in the above equations, the effects of an increase in the tolerated level of 
corruption also depend on the value of ε , observed by the public. But, it is not fundamental in 
determining the sign of θ
τ
∂
∂  and θ
θ
∂
∂ . In the following proposition, we will neglect it (by assuming 
that 0=ε ) to simplify the conditions under which θτ∂∂  and θθ∂∂  might be positive or negative. 
 
Proposition 2c: In the case of opacity, an increase in the tolerated level of corruption induces an 
increase in the tax rate and corruption if 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+< , independently of the relative 
importance of γ  and ψ . The same effects can be observed if the condition concerning μ  is 
reversed and 2εσ  is either sufficiently large or small.  
Proof: See Appendix B.  
In the case where the central bank is sufficiently conservative, the degree of opacity about 
central bank preferences plays a role in determining the direction of the effects of an increase in 
the tolerated level of corruption on the tax rate and corruption. However, the conditions 
concerning 2εσ  are quite lengthy, and without loss of generality, they are not presented here. 
Propositions 2a, 2b and 2c show that the direction of the effects of an increase in the tolerated 
level of corruption on the equilibrium is not altered by the introduction of a low level of opacity. 
If the degree of central bank conservativeness is low enough, an increase in the tolerated 
corruption is always associated with higher inflation expectations. Under a high degree of central 
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bank conservativeness, it positively affects the expected inflation rate if the degree of opacity is 
low enough, while we are uncertain about its effects when the latter is high enough. 
It is to notice that the results reported in Proprositions 2a, 2b are derived under the condition 
that 0>−ψγ . When this condition is reversed, i.e. 0<−ψγ , the results will also be reversed if 
other conditions remain unchanged. Furthermore, the effects of an increase in the tolerated level 
of corruption on the inflation rate and output gap depend on the sign of θ
π
∂
∂ e  and hence that of 
)( ψγ −  as it is straightforward to see from equation (16). 
The equilibrium solutions allow us to examine the effects of opacity on the level of eπ , π , 
τ , θ  and x . Opacity influences macroeconomic variables through its effects on the expected 
inflation rate. Hence, we firstly derive the effects of opacity on eπ  using equation (13) and 
taking account of (14). Then, we use this result and equations (8)-(11) to examine the effects of 
opacity on the level of π , τ , θ  and x  respectively.  
 
Proposition 3a: An increase in opacity has a positive effect on the expected and current inflation 
rate and a negative effect on the output gap if 0>− + ψγ θθ g  and 32222
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> . It has 
the opposite effects if the last condition is reversed. 
Proof: Deriving eπ  given by equation (13) with respect to 2εσ  and taking account of the 
approximation of Ω  given by (14), we obtain:  
{ }23222320322222030 3203
2
22
2
32
3
0
2
}])(2][)())[(1(  {
])(2][)()][())[(1(
δδασδδγααδγδδψγμ
δδγααδγδδψγγθψγμδαδ
σ
π
εε +−Δ++−++Δ−Δ
+−Δ++−+−+Δ=∂
∂ ge .  
Using then equations (8) and (11), we derive π  and x  with respect to 2εσ  as follows: 
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2
32
2
2
)1(
εεε σ
πδδεα
σ
π
∂
∂
Δ
+=∂
∂ e ; 2322 )( εεε σ
πδδεμα
σ ∂
∂
Δ
−−=∂
∂ ex .    
For 0>− + ψγ θθ g , using the definition of 0Δ , we can show that 02 >∂∂ εσ
π e , 02 >∂∂ εσ
π  and 
02 <∂∂ εσ
x  if 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+>  (i.e. 0)(2 320 >+−Δ δδγαα ) and vice versa.   Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3a is formulated under the condition that 0>− + ψγ θθ g . As we have already 
discussed, the target of public expenditures is closely related to the tax rate chosen by the 
government, which induces a fiscal bias. An increase in the tax rate positively affects the wage 
(and hence inflation) expectations. On the other hand, the fight against corruption allows 
reducing the tax rate, and hence the fiscal bias and inflation expectations, for a given level of 
public expenditures. Depending on the relative importance of these opposite effects, inflation 
expectations may increase or decrease. If other conditions remain unchanged, the results will be 
reversed if 0<− + ψγ θθ g .  
Furthermore, we also remark that the degree of central bank conservativeness plays an 
important role in determining the equilibrium effects of opacity on the expected and current 
inflation rate, and output gap. Consider the case where 0>− + ψγ θθ g , which implies that the 
fiscal policies will initially have a negative effect on the output gap and a positive effect on the 
inflation rate. If the central bank is sufficiently conservative on average, i.e. 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> , the public will believe that it will not strongly fight against an increase in 
the inflation rate under opacity. This leads to a higher expected (and current) inflation rate and a 
lower output gap comparing to the case of full transparency. Therefore, a more conservative 
central bank has incentive to communicate more clearly with the public about its preferences. 
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Proposition 3b: An increase in opacity has a negative effect on the tax rate if 
},{max ))((
)1()(
32
322
δδεμ
δδεαψδεμ
θ
ψθγ +− +−−+> g  and 32222
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> . It has a positive effect on the tax 
rate if the last condition is reversed. 
Proof: Using equations (9), we derive τ  with respect to 2εσ  as follows: 
2
3232
2
])1()()()[(
εεε σ
πδδεαγδεμψγδεμα
σ
τ
∂
∂
Δ
++−+−−−=∂
∂ e .   
Conditions ψγ θθ g+>  and 32222
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+>  ensure that 02 >∂∂ εσ
π e . We then have 02 <∂∂ εσ
τ  
if ))((
)1()(
32
322
δδεμ
δδεαψδεμγ +− +−−> . Combining next the conditions concerning γ  leads to 
},{max ))((
)1()(
32
322
δδεμ
δδεαψδεμ
θ
ψθγ +− +−−+> g . Given the last condition and Proposition 3a, we obtain 02 >∂∂ εσ
τ  
if 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+< .     Q.E.D.  
In Proposition 3b, we have put in evidence the effects of opacity on the tax rate by altering 
the degree of central bank conservativeness while the condition concerning γ  remains 
unchanged. Under the latter condition, if the central bank is sufficiently conservative, an increase 
in opacity implies a higher inflation rate, allowing the government to reduce the tax rate thanks to 
an increase in the inflation tax. The results will not be modified if we substitute the condition 
concerning γ  by },{min ))(( )1()( 32 322 δδεμ δδεαψδεμθ ψθγ +− +−−+< g . However, in the case where we have 
},{max},{min ))((
)1()(
))((
)1()(
32
322
32
322
δδεμ
δδεαψδεμ
θ
ψθ
δδεμ
δδεαψδεμ
θ
ψθ γ +− +−−++− +−−+ << gg  while the condition concerning 
μ  is unchanged, the results will be reversed. 
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Proposition 3c: An increase in opacity has a negative effect on the level of corruption if 
0>−ψγ  and 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> . It has a positive effect on the level of corruption if the last 
condition is reversed. 
Proof: Using equation (10), we derive θ  with respect to 2εσ  as follows: 
2
2
2
))((
εεε σ
πδψγεμα
σ
θ
∂
∂
Δ
−−−=∂
∂ e .         
Taking account of Proposition 3a, it leads to Proposition 3c.     Q.E.D.  
According to Proposition 3c, the effects of opacity on corruption depend on the degree of 
central bank conservativeness. For high enough values of γ , if the central bank is sufficiently 
conservative, an increase in opacity can help reducing corruption. On the contrary, in the case of 
a liberal central bank, opacity will induce the government to effectively tolerate more corruption. 
In Proposition 3c, the effects of opacity on the level of corruption vary with the degree of 
central bank conservativeness given that 0>−ψγ . The results remain the same if we substitute 
the condition concerning γ  by g+< θ ψθγ . However, if ψγθ ψθ <<+g  and without altering the 
condition concerning μ , the results will be reversed. 
 
Proposition 4: Under the assumption that 0>−ψγ , an increase in the tolerated level of 
corruption reinforces the sensibility of the expected and current inflation rate to opacity as well 
as that of  output gap if 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+>  and vice versa.  
Proof: Deriving twice eπ  given by equation (13) with respect to 2εσ  and θ , and taking account 
of the approximation of Ω  and rearranging the terms lead to: 
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e  if 0)(2 320 >+−Δ δδγαα , i.e. 
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
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δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> , and vice versa.   
Using equations (8) and (11), we derive twice π  and x  with respect to 2εσ  and θ  as follows: 
θσ
πδδεα
θσ
π
εεε ∂∂
∂
Δ
+=∂∂
∂
2
2
32
2
2
2 )1( e  ;   θσ
πδδεμα
θσ εεε ∂∂
∂
Δ
−−=∂∂
∂
2
2
32
2
2 )( ex .  Q.E.D. 
 
The results presented in Proposition 4 can be interpreted in another way. More precisely, 
under the assumption that 0>−ψγ , an increase in opacity reinforces the sensibility of the 
expected and current inflation rate, and output gap to the tolerated level of corruption if the 
central bank is sufficiently conservative and vice versa. 
Even if the central bank is conservative enough, the public, uncertain about the degree of 
central bank conservativeness, will believe that it will not strongly fight against an increase in the 
inflation rate. This leads to higher expected inflation comparing with the case of full 
transparency. If 0>−ψγ , this effect is reinforced by an increase in the tolerated level of 
corruption since a higher level of corruption will imply a higher tax rate to compensate the loss of 
tax revenue. Higher tax rate and corruption jointly have negative effects on the output gap and 
positive effects on the inflation rate. This leads the public, facing an opaque and quite 
conservative central bank, to anticipate a further increase in the expected inflation rate. 
Therefore, if the government tolerates more corruption, for a conservative central bank, the 
incentive to communicate more clearly with the public about its preferences becomes stronger.  
 
5. The effects of opacity and tolerated corruption on macroeconomic volatility 
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The volatility of inflation and output gap is generated by the shock ε  which affects central bank 
preferences. Central bank opacity affects the volatility of these variables through inflation 
expectations. In effect, it is through the latter channel that opacity interacts with the decisions of 
the government and private sector.  
Using equations (8), (11) and (13), the variances of π  and x  are obtained as follows: 
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−=Ξ  with 3232222 )1)((])())[(( δδεγααδγδδψγεμε +++++−−=Δ . 
Opacity affects )var(π  through Ω  and )( 2ΦE  and )var(x  through Ω  and )( 2ΞE . Deriving 
)var(π  and )var(x  with respect to 2εσ  yields: 
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We remark that the direction of the effects of opacity on the volatility of inflation and output 
gap does not depend on the relative importance of marginal effects of tax and corruption on 
production. In the following, we will examine the conditions under which 2
2 )(
εσ∂
Φ∂E  (or 2
2 )(
εσ∂
Ξ∂E ) and  
2
32
2
32
2
1 εσδδα
δδα
∂
Ω∂
Ω−  have the same sign. When this is the case, we obtain some closed-form conditions 
under which the effects of opacity on the volatility of inflation are clearly determined. When they 
are of opposite sign, there will not be clear-cut conditions given the complexity of their 
respective expressions. 
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Proposition 5a: An increase in opacity positively affects the volatility of inflation if 
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δδγααμ  and  22 εε σσ < . It negatively affects the volatility of 
inflation if one of the following conditions is verified: 
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Proof: See Appendix C. 
The condition concerning μ  given in i) is verified only when 3
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)( >++−
+
δγδδψγ
δδγαα , which 
implies that the central bank is highly conservative. According to Proposition 5a, an increase in 
opacity implies higher inflation volatility if the central bank is sufficiently conservative and the 
initial degree of opacity small enough. Conversely, an increase in opacity allows reducing the 
volatility of inflation when the central bank is highly conservative given a sufficiently high initial 
degree of opacity. The latter effects are observed when the central bank is liberal enough, 
independently of the initial degree of opacity. 
 
Proposition 5b: For 3
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δδγαα , an increase in opacity has a positive effect on the 
volatility of output gap if 
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+ <<  and 22 εε σσ < . It has a negative effect on 
the volatility of output gap if one of the  following conditions is verified:  
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Proof:  See Appendix D.   
If the central bank is conservative, an increase in opacity implies higher volatility of output 
gap when the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently low. However, an increase in opacity 
reduces the volatility of output gap when the central bank is sufficiently conservative but the 
initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high as well as when the central bank is liberal enough. In 
the latter case, the effects are independent of the initial degree of opacity. 
 
Proposition 6: An increase in the tolerated level of corruption has a positive effect on the 
volatility of inflation and output gap if 0>−ψγ  or g+< θ ψθγ . The effects are reversed if  
ψγθ ψθ <<+g . 
 
Proof: We derive )var(π  and )var(x  with respect to θ . It follows straightforwardly that the sign 
of θ
π
∂
∂ )var(  and θ∂
∂ )var(x  depends on that of the expression )]()[( ψγγθψγ −+− g . This leads to the 
conditions given in Proposition 6.            Q.E.D. 
It is to notice that the direction of the effects of an increase in the tolerated level of corruption 
on the volatility of inflation and output gap depend on the relative importance of γ  and ψ . For 
extreme (intermediate) values of γ , the corruption is positively (negatively) linked to the 
volatility of inflation and output gap, independently of the degree of central bank 
conservativeness and the degree of opacity.  
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Having shown how opacity affects the level and volatility of inflation and output gap, we will 
examine whether there is a case for more opacity. When the central bank decided not to reveal 
private information about its preferences, it accepted lower equilibrium inflation (and higher 
output gap) in exchange of greater macroeconomic instability. If the equilibrium level and 
volatility of inflation were both increasing (or decreasing) in opacity, there would be no such 
trade-off with respect to the degree of opacity. In the case where both inflation level and volatility 
were increasing in opacity, the most desirable situation is that the central bank should be fully 
transparent ( 02 =εσ ). Inversely, if both of them were decreasing in opacity, there would be a case 
for monetary policy opacity.  
According to Proposition 3a, we have 02 >∂∂ εσ
π  if 0>− + ψγ θθ g  and 32222
32
)()(
)(
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+>  or 
if 0<− + ψγ θθ g  and 32222
32
)()(
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δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+< . Meanwhile, as shown in Proposition 5a, we could 
have 02
)var( <∂
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π  if 
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δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> , independently of the relative importance of γ  and ψ . 
Therefore, under some conditions, we can simultaneously have 02 >∂∂ εσ
π  and 02
)var( <∂
∂
εσ
π  for any 
initial degree of opacity. However, under certain conditions for which the initial degree of 
opacity plays a role, we can simultaneously obtain 02 <∂∂ εσ
π  and 02
)var( >∂
∂
εσ
π . In these two cases, 
the trade-off is possible since the central bank that desires to reduce the volatility of inflation 
could accept an increase in the level of inflation and vice versa. 
On the other hand, Propositions 4a and 5a implies that we can simultaneously have 02 >∂∂ εσ
π  
and 02
)var( >∂
∂
εσ
π  under certain conditions imposed on the degree of central bank conservativeness 
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and the initial degree of opacity. In this case, more transparency is preferable to less if initially 
the central bank is not fully transparent. Nevertheless, we can also have 02 <∂∂ εσ
π  and 02
)var( <∂
∂
εσ
π  
at the same time. Hence, there is a case for opacity under certain conditions.  
Without giving the detailed calculations and using the results given in Propositions 5a and 6, 
we can deduce from equation (28) that opacity and tolerated corruption can mutually reinforce or 
weaken each other’s effects on the volatility of inflation. For example, when the degree of central 
bank conservativeness is sufficiently high and the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently low, 
their effects are mutually reinforced if the marginal effect of tax on production is strong enough 
or weak enough, or mutually weakened if the marginal effect of tax is at intermediate levels.  
Taking account of Proposition 4, we can state that in some circumstances, central bank 
transparency becomes more compelling, notably when the central bank is sufficiently 
conservative. In these circumstances, more transparency allows reducing the effects of corruption 
on the level and volatility of inflation. Under other conditions, there may be a case for opacity in 
order to compensate for the undesirable effects of corruption on macroeconomic performance and 
volatility, mainly when the central bank is liberal. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between institutional quality and central bank 
transparency and their implications for macroeconomic performance and volatility through the 
interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. We have found that the results depend on the relative 
importance of the marginal effects of distortionary tax and corruption on production, the degree 
of central bank conservativeness as well as the degree of opacity about central bank preferences.  
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In the case of full transparency, when the marginal effect of tax on production is greater than 
that of corruption, an increase in the tolerated level of corruption has positive effects on the 
current and expected inflation rate, tax rate and corruption and a negative effect on the output 
gap. On the contrary, if the marginal effect of tax is smaller than that of corruption, an increase in 
the tolerated level of corruption will result in a higher output gap and hence will incite the central 
bank to reduce the inflation rate, reversing thus the previous effects. 
The introduction of a low level of opacity will not modify the direction of the effects of an 
increase in the tolerated level of corruption on endogenous variables. If the marginal effect of tax 
on production is greater than that of corruption, under a low degree of conservativeness, more 
tolerance for corruption by the government is always associated with higher expected inflation. 
Under a high degree of conservativeness, the tolerated level of corruption is positively linked to 
the expected inflation rate if the degree of opacity is sufficiently low, while the effects are 
indeterminate when the degree of opacity is high enough.  
In terms of macroeconomic performance, we have found that when the marginal effect of tax 
on production is sufficiently large, an increase in opacity has a positive effect on the expected and 
current inflation rate and a negative effect on the output gap, tax rate and corruption if the central 
bank is conservative enough. These effects are reversed if the central bank is sufficiently liberal 
and/or the marginal effect of tax on production sufficiently low. Central bank opacity and the 
tolerated level of corruption mutually reinforces (weakens) each other’s effects on the 
equilibrium if the degree of central bank conservativeness is sufficiently high (low). 
Finally, when the central bank is sufficiently conservative, an increase in opacity might 
induce higher (lower) volatility of inflation and output gap if the initial degree of opacity is low 
(high) enough. An increase in opacity allows reducing the volatility of inflation and output gap 
when the central bank is conservative enough, given a high initial degree of opacity. The negative 
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effects of opacity are also observed when the central bank is liberal enough, independently of the 
initial degree of opacity. Furthermore, opacity and tolerated corruption can mutually reinforce or 
weaken each other’s effects on the volatility of inflation.  
Central bank transparency could become more compelling when the central bank is 
sufficiently conservative. However, there could be a case for opacity in order to compensate for 
the undesirable effects of corruption on macroeconomic performance and volatility when the 
central bank is liberal. 
 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2a 
In the case of opacity, when 0>−ψγ , according to equation (16), we have 0>∂∂ θπ
e
 if: 
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Taking account of the definition of 0Δ , we have: 
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+> , for condition (A.1) to be checked, we 
must impose that 22 εε σσ < . If 0)(2 320 <+−Δ δδγαα , i.e. 
3
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δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+< , condition 
(A.1) is always verified.           Q.E.D 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2c 
To determine the sign of θ
τ
∂
∂ , we substitute θ
π
∂
∂ e  given by equation (16) and the approximation of 
Ω  given by (14) into equation (18) as follows: 
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Departing from the case of full transparency, evaluating θ
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Since equation (B.1) can be reduced to equation (26) when 02 =εσ , it follows that: 
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equation (B.1) are both positive and hence 0>∂∂θτ .  
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δγδδψγ
δδγααμ ++−
+> , to obtain 0>∂∂θτ , the denominator and 
numerator of equation (B.1) must be both positive or both negative. We distinguish two cases.  
First case: The denominator and numerator of equation (B.1) are both positive. For that to be 
possible, we must simultaneously have 22 εε σσ <  and  
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To have 0>∂∂θτ , it is sufficient to impose the condition (B.2), which is more restrictive than 
the condition 22 εε σσ <  given that 0)(2 320 >+−Δ δδγαα .   
Second case: The denominator and numerator of equation (B.1) are both negative. 
Consequently, we must simultaneously have 22 εε σσ >  and  
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            (B.3) 
In order to obtain 0>∂∂θτ , it is sufficient to impose the condition 22 εε σσ >  as the latter is more 
restrictive than condition (B.3).  
To determine now the sign of θ
θ
∂
∂ , we substitute θ
π
∂
∂ e  given by equation (16) and the 
approximation of Ω  given by (14) into equation (19). Evaluating the resulting equation at 0=ε  
and 02 >εσ  and rearranging the terms, we obtain: 
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If 02 =εσ , equation (B.4) is equivalent to equation (27). Consequently, we have: 
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+> , to obtain 0>∂∂θθ , the denominator and 
numerator of equation (B.4) must be both positive or negative. Two cases are distinguished. 
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First case: The denominator and numerator of equation (B.4) are both positive. Hence, we 
must simultaneously have 22 εε σσ <  and           
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It is sufficient to impose condition (B.5) in order to have 0>∂∂θθ  since it is more restrictive 
than the condition 22 εε σσ < . 
Second case: The denominator and numerator of equation (B.4) are both negative. Therefore, 
we must simultaneously have 22 εε σσ >  and  
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For ensuring 0>∂∂θθ , it is sufficient to impose the condition 22 εε σσ > , which is more 
restrictive than condition (B.6).                                                   Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5a 
Using the second-order Taylor approximation, we obtain: 
.})(2])())[(3({])())[(1(1)( 24
0
323
2
22
2
3
2
22
2
2
0
2 εσδδγααδγδδψγμδγδδψγμ Δ
+−++−+++−++Δ≈ΦE
Deriving )( 2ΦE  with respect to 2εσ  yields: 
.})(2])())[(3({])())[(1()( 4
0
323
2
22
2
3
2
22
2
2
2
Δ
+−++−+++−+=∂
Φ∂ δδγααδγδδψγμδγδδψγμ
σε
E  (C.1) 
 33
According to (28), to obtain 02
)var( >∂
∂
εσ
π , it is sufficient to have 02
2)( >∂
Φ∂
εσ
E  and 
02
32
2
32
2
1
>∂ Ω∂Ω− εσδδα
δδα . Using (C.1), we can easily show that a sufficient condition for 02
2)( >∂
Φ∂
εσ
E  is 
that 3
3
2
22
2
32
)()(
)(2 −> ++−
+
δγδδψγ
δδγααμ .  
To have 02
32
2
32
2
1
>∂ Ω∂Ω− εσδδα
δδα , we distinguish two possibilities, i.e. 3221 δδαΩ−  and 2εσ∂
Ω∂  are 
simultaneously positive or negative. Using (14), we obtain: 
3
0
3203
2
22
2
2
])(2][)())[(1(
Δ
+−Δ++−+=∂
Ω∂ δδγααδγδδψγμ
σε
.                     (C.2) 
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5b 
Using the second-order Taylor approximation yields:  
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